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Leeds Beckett University, Montpellier Business School 
Abstract: This study analyses the implications of oil prices shocks for the BRICS economies. We 
employed a time-varying structural vector autoregressive (TV-SVA) framework in which the sources 
of time variation are the coefficients and variance-covariance matrix of the innovations. The quarter 
frequency data for the period of 1987QII – 2017QII is used for the empirical analysis. The key 
findings suggest that there are substantial differences and asymmetries in the response of these 
economies to oil shocks. These differences were profound between, and even within, oil exporters and 
importers. It shows that between major oil exporters i.e. Russia and Brazil the former’s economy is 
rather more intensively influenced by oil prices shocks. Between the two largest net oil importers i.e. 
India and China, comparatively, the Indian economy seems to be rather more vulnerable to oil prices 
shocks in terms of their adverse effects on GDP, inflation and balance of trade. The dependence of 
economies on oil and an increasing level of consumption continue to pose policy challenges for prices 
and economic stability. The analysis on South Africa also shows negative impacts of oil prices 
shocks, however, the effects are comparatively more time-variant than other BRICS members. While 
these asymmetries indicate significant differences in the structure of these economies they also 
indicate venues of cooperation and stronger trading relationships to overcome the adverse shocks and 
mutual development.  
Keywords: Oil Consumption, Trade Balance, Inflation, GDP, Oil Price Shocks, BRICS, 
TVSVAR Model  
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1. Introduction
In the recent history of economic and political alliances, the BRICS have turned out to be a 
systemic and influential block. As it stands, the BRICS economies constitute over 46% of the 
world population, over 20% of the world GDP and 26% of the world’s land mass (IMF, 
2015). Furthermore, the combined foreign reserves of the BRICS countries are estimated to 
be over US$ 5 trillion, indicating the resilience of these economies and miraculous export-led 
economic growth in the recent history of global trade. The members of the BRICS 
increasingly recognise themselves as a group, starting from the interaction of Foreign 
Ministers in 2006, which led to the annual summit of the Heads of State in 2009 when the 
depth and scope of the dialogue among the members was further enhanced. Importantly, the 
remarkable growth in the BRICS economies has been significantly led by their export sectors. 
The statistics speak clear and loud, according to statistics from the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), the participation of BRICS in global exports more than doubled between 2001 and 
2011, from 8% to 16%. In just over a decade, the total size of exports has grown more than 
500%, while total global exports grew 195% in the same period. Between 2002 and 2012, 
intra-BRICS trade increased 922%, from US$ 27 to 276 billion, while for the period of 2010-
2012, BRICS’ international trade rose 29%, from US$ 4.7 to 6.1 trillion dollars. Therefore, in 
a fairly short span of time, the BRICS has become a new and promising political and 
economic entity. Concomitantly, the size, significance and swift growth of the BRICS 
economies possess ecological challenges for the whole world.  
Despite the remarkable success, since Global Financial Crisis (2008) and particularly in the 
last couple of years, the synergy between BRICS has begun to break down. Some of the 
BRICS economies, notably the slower growth in China, political changes in Brazil, economic 
sanctions on Russia
2
, a slump in oil prices and steadily falling commodity prices have
contributed to this. The World Bank in her report Global Economic Prospects (2016) has 
highlighted these downside risks
3
 from the emerging markets for the growth in 2016. The
BRICS are made up of oil exporting countries (Russia and Brazil); oil importing countries 
(Indian, China and South Africa). In terms of its importance, oil is one of the most traded 
commodity in the world. As it stands, the total size of the oil market is over US$ 1.7 trillion 
2
 See Dreger et al (2016) on the impact of recent sanctions on Russia and Implications for its economy.  
3
 The World Bank (2016) in her report cautioned that there could be a more protracted slowdown across large 
emerging markets which could have substantial spillovers to other developing economies, and eventually hold 
back the recovery in advanced economies. For further details please refer to the report available at 
< http://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/global-economic-prospects >  
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(EIA, 2016). This importance is due to its status as the primary input in the production 
process and it is a commodity that will most likely be traded for many more years to come 
(Rafiq et al. 2016)
4
. Nevertheless, it is projected that global oil demand will continue to
increase until at least 2035, so does the oil production reaching double or even triple of its 
current levels (Reynolds, 2014). This then also implies ecological challenges the world would 
face. Daily global oil consumption is expected to grow from 89 million barrels in 2012 up to 
109 million barrels in 2035 (Statista, 2017). Concomitantly, dynamics and large fluctuations 
in global oil prices could affect the economies of the BRICS in different ways and therefore 
this poses a whole set of new challenges for the BRICS countries and also provides rationale 
and motivation for the subject study.  
It is prima facie that economic growth in the BRICS economies have been export-led and 
resulted in major surpluses in their current accounts, especially for Brazil, China and Russia. 
It then raises an intuitive question of what constitutes the tradable of these economies. The 
comparative analysis of the largest imports and exports of BRICS countries suggests that oil 
and petroleum products are the largest import as well as the second largest export of the 
BRICS countries. Accordingly to the Brazilian Ministry of Finance (2014) in the year 2010, 
15.5% of exports by the BRICS countries constituted oil and petroleum, while 19.2% of 
imports were also oil and petroleum
5
. Figure-1 is a good and concise depiction of dynamics
of demand and supply of oil in BRICS countries over a period of two and half decades. 
4
There is a significant association between oil and economy which also have strong ecological dimensions. See 
e.g.  Kallis and Sager (2017) for  the interesting insight on the oil & economy nexus through the lens of
ecological economists 
5
 See pie charts of with Breakdown of 10 major imports and exports of BRICS economies. 
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Figure-1: Crude Oil Balance of Trade 1990 – 2015, Source; Enerdata (2016) 
The positive values imply excessive demands and hence deficit in the trade balance of crude 
oil and vice versa. As it suggests, there has been a consistent increase in the demand for oil 
by emerging economies of Indian and China, in fact in 2015, China imported as much crude 
oil as the United States (Enerdata, 2016). On the consumption of oil and its association with 
economic growth, the evidence suggests that oil consumption is the main driver behind the 
progress of industrialization and urbanization (Halkos et al. 2011).  Concomitantly, it is prima 
facia evident that fuel and petroleum are the major imports as well as exports of the BRICS 
economies. The empirical evidence suggests that volatility in oil prices have a different 
impact on an oil-exporting economy to that of an oil-importing economy’s trade balances 
(Kilian et al. 2011). Perhaps, being an exporter, it is important for the exporting countries as 
it affects their income, while for importing countries it may raise the cost of production and 
act as a negative supply-side shock. Since the Global Oil Shock in the 1970s, studies on the 
macroeconomic dynamics have argued that the fluctuation of oil prices is an important factor 
that contributes to economic fluctuations and the essence of a global shock that is likely to 
affect many economies whether it is oil-importing or oil exporting. On the external balance of 
an economy, the impact of the volatility of oil prices on trade balances have been the focus of 
investigations, though often directed at industrialised countries (Rotemberg and Woodford 
1996, Bollino 2007, Kilian et al. 2009, Ozlale and Pekkurnaz 2010, Bodenstein et al. 2011, 
Le and Chang 2013). With the rapid globalisation and free trade, the effect of volatility of oil 
prices shall not be gigantic if cushioned for oil-importing and oil-exporting countries. 
However, it has been argued that this was not the case, the volatility in oil prices are said to 
have a different impact on an oil-exporting economy to that of an oil-importing economy’s 
trade balances (Kilian et al. 2011). Differences on the impact of low oil prices on trade 
balance of an oil-importing country to that of an oil-exporting country is expected, the impact 
of positive and negative oil shocks on macroeconomic variables differs both in the way and 
extents (Narayan and Sharma 2011, Cashin et al. 2014).  
Nevertheless, the dependence on trade or openness of an economy is a major reliance point as 
it can improve economic efficiency through the correct utilisation of resources and on the 
other hand, it could result in a trade deficit and in turn slow down economic growth. It could 
be the case for the BRICS where a member like Russia relies heavily on oil exports and 
China and India due to its vast economic reforms, relies heavily on oil imports as its input for 
production processes. This heavy reliance on oil, being either an exporter or importer, entails 
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potential implications beyond trade balance to the domestic economy. As such, on internal 
balance of an economy i.e. inflation and output, a number of studies have investigated the 
impact of oil shocks on domestic economy (see Hamilton 2005, Barsky and Kilian 2004, 
Backus and Crucini 2000, Kilian et al. 2009, Kallis and Sager 2017, a detailed discussion in 
next section) and documented that macroeconomic variables like inflation and economic 
growth that are most likely to be affected by the volatility of oil prices whether it is an oil 
importing or an oil exporting country. Considering a hike in oil prices as a negative supply 
shock, it has been demonstrated that there is an adverse impact on the global economy and 
most of the increase in oil prices preceded almost every recession that has happened since 
1965 (Tang et al. 2010). However, the recent decrease in the world oil prices from the second 
quarter of 2014 to the beginning of 2016 (a slump of over 70%
6
 in price) did not turn out to
be a positive supply shock which could have led to a significant growth in global economy 
(FRED, 2017). This is prima facie evidence that the positive supply shock could also have 
negative demand implications. 
The following is an account of the differences in the way BRICS are affected as oil shocks hit 
their respective economies. The BRICS are chosen due to the importance of this block in the 
global economy, furthermore, this is also an interesting block in a sense that two of its 
members Brazil and Russia are exporters of oil while India, China and South Africa are net 
importers. Nevertheless, an important point we shall emphasise here (also evident in Figure-
1) that there has been a huge increase in the demand for oil in India and China, which may
also have time-varying effects on the nexus between oil prices shocks and internal & external 
balances of BRICS countries. These factors are the main motivation and provide rationale for 
the subject study. Concomitantly, the intention of this study to determine the impact of oil 
prices on internal balances i.e. GPD and inflation and external balances (balance of trade) of 
BRICS. To facilitate this endeavour, we employed a Time-Varying Structural Vector 
Autoregression (TV-SVAR) framework on the data from 1987QII to 2017QII. Our key 
findings suggest that there are substantial heterogeneities in the response of BRICS 
economies to oil shocks. Comparative analysis brought home to us that the said differences 
were, in fact, profound between and even within oil exporters and importers. Specifically, it 
showed that between the major oil exporters i.e. Russia and Brazil, the former’s economy 
was rather more intensively influenced by oil price shocks. On the other hand, the 
6
 The Crude Oil Prices (Brent) fell from its peak from over US$ 115 in June 2014 to around US$27 per barrel in 
January 2016 (FRED, 2017). 
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comparison between the two largest net oil importers i.e. India and China suggested that the 
Indian economy seemed to rather more vulnerable to oil price shocks in terms of their 
adverse effects on GDP, inflation and balance of trade. The analysis on South Africa also 
showed a negative impact of oil price shocks, however, the effects are comparatively more 
time-variant than other BRICS members.   
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: Section-2 provides a brief review of the 
literature and existing evidence related to the subject, in Section-3, we will set out a TV-
SVAR framework as a means to analyse the association among variables of interest and 
Section-4 will report the empirical results which will lead to a conclusion in Section-5.    
2 Literature Review 
2.1 Oil Shocks and Economy 
Since its discovery, oil being an essential element, directly associated with production 
process has notable effects on inflation and output. The spark of interest to study the impact 
of oil prices on the economy arose in the 1970’s following two conjointly episodes of oil 
shocks (Rafiq et al. 2016). On this aspect, pioneer work by Hamilton (1983) suggested that 
oil prices shocks have substantially contributed to the economic contractions in the U.S. In 
succeeding contributions, Hamilton (1988, 1996) further emphasised the relationship between 
recessions and oil shocks. Drawing on the foundation laid by Hamilton, a number of studies 
dug further into this line of inquiry and extended our insight on the impact of oil prices on 
production and output (Rafiq et al. 2016). Besides income and production, oil prices can also 
have an effect on other aspects of an economy such as inflation, interest rate, exchange rate 
and stock prices (Kilian and Vigfusson 2011, Kilian and Vigfusson, 2011b, Kallis and Sager 
2017). However, in specific to this study we are focused on inflation, GDP and balance of 
trade of the BRICS economies in the face of oil shocks
7
.
2.2. Oil Shocks and Internal Balance 
In terms of internal balance or domestic macroeconomic outlook, the volatility in oil prices 
has been perceived to often have a negative impact on the aggregate economy. An increase in 
oil price leads to an increase in the overall price level and a decrease in output. Furthermore, 
a rise in oil prices has a negative impact on commodity prices which results in a reduction in 
7
 The inflation and GDP can be seen as the internal balance between the growth and price level and the balance 
of trade as external balance of the BRICS economies. 
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aggregate demand (Dornbursch et al. 2001). The macroeconomic effects of oil shocks are 
transmitted mainly via demand and supply-side channels. In terms of a supply channel, as the 
crude oil is used as an input in the industrial production processes, an increase in oil prices 
can increase the marginal cost of production thus decreasing the company’s capacity 
utilisation which then leads to a decrease in output and employment (Tang et al. 2010). 
Nevertheless, the fluctuations in oil prices may cause a decrease in investment and if there is 
a persistence of high oil prices then the capacity of future production may experience a 
reduction. Concomitantly, the volatility of oil prices is of concern as investors could also 
become very sceptical and postpone investments (Verleger 1994, Hamilton 1996). Therefore, 
Hamilton (1996) argued that an increase in oil prices will cause a structural shift in oil-
intensive industries as their production will be limited, whereas non-oil dependent industries 
are likely to benefit and will increase their production processes. The demand side channel is 
closely related to the supply side channel when there is a rise in oil prices, production 
processes are reduced and the overall price level is increased. The increase in the overall 
prices translates to the decrease in purchasing power of money and an increase in living costs 
(Jimenez- Rodriguez and Sanchez, 2005). Furthermore, there is a transfer of income and 
resources that follow, it is mainly from oil-importing countries to oil-exporting countries 
which are more likely to decrease the global aggregate demand (Tang et al. 2009). An 
important point to emphasise here is the symmetry of transmission mechanism in oil 
exporting and importing countries, given that the subject economies of BRICS are different in 
their size, structure, oil production and consumption, it is very intuitive that their domestic 
economies (and trade balance) may respond differently to oil shocks. 
The nexus between oil prices shocks and inflation have macroeconomic policy implications, 
a cost-push oil shock may lead the monetary authorities to take a tightening stance. Hence, to 
strike the right balance between inflation and output (maintain the internal balance), interest 
rates may rise influencing the aggregate demand in the economy (see Ferderer 1996, Hunt et 
al. 2001). Basing our reasoning on the same logic, it is will be fair to argue that if the 
transmission mechanism of oil prices shocks in the different BRICS economies vary, the 
policy responses shall vary too. The BRICS includes two of the largest economies in the 
world, China and India, which have been growing rapidly leading to an increase in household 
expenditures, the demand for primary energy consumption has increased enormously which 
has therefore left a big gap between oil production and its consumption, leaving it no other 
choice but large-scale imports. There have been episodes of rapid increase in oil prices which 
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have caused concerns about the global growth, however, the effects could vary country by 
country due to their difference in economic structure, energy consumption and dependence 
on the international energy market (Wu et al. 2010). The existing limited evidence on the 
BRICS economies is analysis of individual countries, for instance, Tang et al. (2010) on 
China reported negative impact of oil prices hikes on output, investment and positive impact 
on inflation, while on Russia, Rautava (2004) and Kuboniwa (2014) reported positive, but 
contrarily, studies, for instance, Benedictow et al. (2013), Dülger et al. (2013) and Mironov 
and Petronevich (2015) reported negative effects. They argued that as the energy prices 
increase, appreciation of the rubble can have harmful effects (Dutch disease), nevertheless, 
there could also be substitution and income effects for non-oil producers and consumers. A 
study by Idrisov et al. (2015) suggested that in fact, the impact of oil prices changes on 
Russian economy has actually decreased. While, a recent study on Russia, in the light of 
recent sanctions on Ukraine issue, Dreger et al. (2016) showed a very strong association 
between oil prices and the Russian economy (interest rate and exchange rate). Given that we 
consider the BRICS as a block, an holistic analysis of this block is feasible. It is intuitive to 
expect some asymmetries in the response of these economies to oil shocks. Perhaps, 
awareness of them can then lead to provide a context in which further cooperation can be 
extended. Nevertheless, the structure of these economies has seen substantial shifts leading to 
increasing energy appetite which could also have implications for external balance. 
2.3 Oil Shocks and External Balance 
Oil prices can impact trade balances of countries, firstly through the terms of trade and 
secondly via wealth effects (Amano and Van Norden, 1998). It is intuitive to expect some 
heterogeneity in the response of the external position of different economies to oil price 
shocks, contingent on their economic structure and net trade position in oil. The imbalances 
in the current account position can occur through different channels, however, we will 
concentrate on two particular channels which are trade and financial channels as they are 
much more pertinent to the theme of this treatise. Through the trade channel if there is an 
increase in oil prices then its effect decreases real income in oil-importing economies which 
then, in turn, deteriorate the terms of trade. As a consequence of the fall in real income in 
importing countries, domestic consumption will be reduced as well as investment, 
furthermore, oil-importing countries’ will depreciate and oil-exporting countries’ currency 
may appreciate (Kilian et al. 2007). The rippling effect will cause a decrease in real output for 
oil-importing countries at least in the short-run. As for the financial channel, if there is a 
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decrease in the asset prices and dividends in oil-importing countries due to an increase in oil 
prices, then all the asset owners will be affected but the asset prices in oil exporters will 
increase, which will as well affect all asset owners resulting in a temporary imbalance in the 
current account of oil-importing and oil-exporting countries. However, keeping the 
transmission channels in context, the point requires emphasis is that most theoretical models 
that have been used to demonstrate the effect of oil prices fluctuations on the economy (most 
importantly on the external accounts) have been constructed in a time-invariant fashion and 
oil prices have been treated as an exogenous factor compared to the whole economy (Kilian 
et al. 2007, Bodenstein et al. 2011). Moreover, it has been argued that there is concrete 
empirical evidence demonstrating that the global macroeconomic fluctuations have an impact 
on the prices of oil, with oil prices fluctuations, the booming global business cycle expansion 
has been said to be the cause of the rapid increase in the prices of oil. However, the same 
economic shocks that impact the external accounts also impact the prices of crude oil making 
it difficult to differentiate between the cause and effect of the increase in oil prices on 
external accounts.   
There are differences in the way how oil prices affect trade balances due to oil supply and 
demand shocks and also there are differences in the way, oil shocks have impact on the 
importers and exporters (Kilian et al. 2009, Le and Chang 2013, Rafiq et al. 2016). According 
to Rodriguez and Sanchez (2005), the volatility in oil prices affects the supply and demand 
side of real economic activities. Furthermore, an increase in oil prices will result in an 
increase in production costs which would then decrease the level of supply, decrease income 
on investment and decrease investment demands which then, in turn, affect trade. On the 
impact of oil prices shocks, it has been often suggested that the impact of high oil prices on 
the trade balance of an oil-exporting country is positive (Rafiq et al. 2016). However, Le and 
Chang (2013) pointed out that an increase in oil prices is not all positive, with an increase in 
oil prices, pressure is exerted on the inflation in global markets making imports more 
expensive for oil-importing and oil-exporting countries
8
. Furthermore, the demand for oil will
decrease which will affect the trade balance of an oil-exporting country (demand effect) and 
also an increase in oil prices will have a negative effect on oil-importing countries, as it will 
slow down their production processes and imports which will then again affect the trade 
8
 As discussed earlier, as the result of the inflation, monetary authorities would have to increase the interest rates 
to curb the inflation which would then lead to a decrease in consumption and investment resulting in an 
economic slowdown (Ferderer, 1996).  
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balance of an oil-exporting country (supply effect). Based on this notion, it can be argued that 
an oil exporter’s gain from an increase in oil prices relies heavily on the interdependencies of 
the revenues, demand and supply effects (Le and Chang 2013, Cashin et al. 2014). Moreover, 
even if there is an overall positive impact from the increase in oil prices for the oil-exporting 
country, there are counteracting negative concerns such as the Dutch disease and dependency 
on trading partners.   
As for oil-importing countries, some studies have documented the negative effect of the 
increase in oil prices on their terms of trade (Kim and Loungani, 1992). But, Kilian (2010) 
argued that the cost share effect needs to be taken into consideration, the negative cost shock 
might not be as big as it seems and the cost share of oil might be small in oil-importing 
countries’ production process (in this study it could be South Africa or smaller exporter 
Brazil, refer to Figure-1). Furthermore, there are other types of energy sources and it might 
not be a problem for oil-importing countries to decrease their cost share of oil in the 
production process locally and also, oil importing countries can counteract the adverse effect 
of increasing oil prices by increasing the exports of other non-oil products to the oil-exporting 
trading partners and so improving their trade position. Hence, it can be inferred that as oil-
exporting countries, the effect of positive oil prices shocks on oil importing countries can be 
determined by taking account of all these effects. The effect of low oil prices on the trade 
balance of oil-exporting countries has been documented to have two types of effect one being 
negative, which is the revenue effect, with low oil prices, income decreases, however the 
second effect is a positive one, as when oil prices decrease, there is an increase in demand 
from oil-importing countries known as the demand effect (Kilian, 2010). As for the 
movement of free trade sweeping the world, a decrease in oil prices could very well benefit 
oil exporters as their terms of trade will ameliorate with the increase in demand, but there is 
also a negative consequence, with low oil prices oil importers will tend to increase their oil 
imports thus putting pressure on their external balances. Concomitantly, only an analysis of 
aggregate net trade balances can suggest the net implications of oil shocks.  
The trade balances are of much importance to global economic stability, the matter of 
concern is that through the increase or decrease in global oil prices, huge trade imbalances 
have been created for oil-importing and oil-exporting countries, much aggressively impacted 
oil-importing countries. On this issue, Fratzscher et al. (2014) argued that an increase in oil 
prices could lead to a trade imbalance in oil-importing countries because oil-intensive 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
11 
products become more expensive and therefore the depreciation of the country’s currency can 
cushion the effect of the imbalances in the shorter term but in the longer term, the extent of 
the impact will have to be eradicated by the use of different policies. However, Buetzer et al. 
(2012) argue that for oil-exporting countries, a rise in oil prices could potentially lead to the 
Dutch Disease’s phenomenon, meaning the prices of the non-tradable goods will increase and 
the appreciation of their currency which then leads to their exports becoming more expensive. 
In order to demonstrate this phenomenon, Lizardo and Mollick (2010) using the US as an 
example, conclude that an increase in oil prices caused its currency to depreciate against the 
currencies of oil exporters like Canada, Mexico and Russia. On Russia, empirical studies 
have documented a varying decrease of impact on trade balance and economy (contrast 
Rautava 2004, Ito 2010, Kuboniwa 2014, Dreger et al. 2016). Among other studies in similar 
dimension, Raguindin and Reyes (2005) on the Philippines, Wakeford (2006) on South 
Africa and Gounder and Bartleet (2007) on New Zealand have reported negative effects of oil 
price shocks on trade balances. Interestingly, on China, Lai (2004), Thai-Ha (2010) and Wu 
et al. (2012) argued that oil prices shocks are not of much concern for China as it has 
amassed huge surpluses, maintained a stable currency and growth. Nevertheless, Qianqian 
(2011) reported that the effects on the Chinese trade balance are only short term. This is an 
interesting line of argument, perhaps, having large trade surpluses in the face of oil price 
shocks due to the strong exporting sector does not imply that oil shocks will have no effects. 
Perhaps, counterfactually China could have amassed even greater surpluses. In fact, a rather 
recent, study by Wei and Guo (2016) reported stronger effects of oil prices on exports of the 
Chinese state-owned enterprises. This then implies a case of time varying response of the 
Chinese economy and perhaps, other BRICS member’s external position to oil shocks. 
Nonetheless, being an exporter shall not universally infer a positive implication of oil shocks 
for the economy, a comparative study by Kuboniwa (2014) on oil-rich economies of the 
Pacific-Rim including Russia, Malaysia and Indonesia reported that oil prices have a positive 
impact on terms of trade in Russia and Malaysia, however, in case of Indonesia the impact 
was negative. Similarly, Wang et al. (2013) significant difference in the impact of oil prices 
shocks on oil importing and exporting countries as well as differences in terms of oil 
dependency. Concomitantly, it may have various heterogeneities in the responses of oil 
exporters and importers among BRICS members. Keeping that in context, this study is an 
endeavour to analyse the impact of oil prices shocks on the BRICS economies in a TV-SVAR 
framework, details follow in the next section.  
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3. Methodology and Data
3.1 Methodology 
We use a Time-Varying Structural Vector Auto-Regressive (TV-SVAR) model to analysis 
the impact of oil prices shocks on inflation, GDP and trade balances of BRICS region. Our 
framework drew on the foundations laid in seminal work by Primiceri (2005) and Del Negro 
and Primiceri (2015)
9
. There are a number of studies which contributed to the development of
time-varying modelling. For instance, Canova (1993), Sims (1993), Stock and Watson (1996) 
and Cogley and Sargent (2001) made remarkable contributions to the estimation of VAR 
frameworks in which they used drifting coefficients, on the other hand, studies, like Harvey 
et al. (1994), Kim et al. (1998) and Chib et al. (2002) promoted the notion of multivariate 
stochastic volatility into models
10
. However, there were two caveats in these frameworks a)
the simultaneous relation in the under analysis variables in their models were time invariant, 
b) their analysis was limited to the reduced form models with feasibility only for descriptive
analysis of data for forecasting purposes. However, this study employs the TV-SVAR 
framework, where, coefficients and entire variance-covariance matrix of the shocks are 
allowed to vary over time. This is crucial if the objective is distinguishing between changes in 
typical size of the exogenous innovations and changes in the transmission mechanism of oil 
prices shocks (Primiceri, 2005). Often in the time variation frameworks, discrete breaks are 
included to cater for the limited number of switching regimes (for instance, see Sims 1999, 
Sims and Zha 2006). The discrete break model is feasible to consider the rapid shift in the 
under analysis entities, however, it seems less suitable to capture behaviour of 
macroeconomic aggregates and market participants in response to oil prices shocks, 
particularly, in a scenario where aggregation among agents usually plays the role of 
smoothing most of the changes (See Primiceri, 2005 for details discussion). Concomitantly, 
in this treatise, the dynamics of macroeconomic aggregates and oil prices shocks favours a 
model with smooth and continuous drifting coefficients and heteroscedasticity innovations 
over a model with discrete breaks.  
9
 Please see Primiceri (2005) for an interesting insight into the development of TVSVAR framework. 
10
 With all the regards to novelty of their framework, they did imposed some restrictions on the evolution over 
time of the elements of the variance-covariance matrix. Their typical restriction was that the covariances do not 
evolve independently of the variances or a factor structure for the covariance matrix.  Among other remarkable 
efforts, Boivin (2001) considered the case of time varying simultaneous relations but did not address the 
potential heteroscedasticity of the innovations. Later, Ciccarelli and Rebucci (2003) extend the framework of 
Boivin (2001) allowing for t-distributed errors, which account for non-persistent changes in the scale of the 
variances over time. Although, by Uhlig (1997) introduced unrestricted multivariate stochastic volatility in the 
context of VARs, his model assumed that the VAR coefficients are constant.  
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
13 
3.2 TS-VAR Model 
Considering the fact that the TV-SVAR model employed in this study occasions the 
properties of time-variation in coefficients and variance-covariance matrix of the additive 
innovations, concomitantly, it is beneficial as the drifting coefficients capture the possible 
nonlinearities or time-variation in the lag structure of the model. Nevertheless, the 
multivariate stochastic volatility captures the possible heteroscedasticity of the shocks and 
nonlinearities in the simultaneous relations among the variables of interest. Therefore, it is 
the data employed which determines if the time variation of the linear structure derives from 
changes in the size of the shocks (impulse) or from changes in the propagation mechanism 
(response). Let’s starts by considering the following model: -  
tktktttt uByBCy   ,1,1 .......... t = 1, ………., T. (1) 
where 𝑦𝑡 is an n x 1 vector of observed endogenous variables; in specific to subject study, 
these will be GDP growth, inflation and trade balance; 𝐶𝑡 is an n x 1 vector of time varying 
coefficients that multiply constant terms; 𝐵𝑖,𝑡,𝑖=1,…,𝑘 are the n x n matrices of time varying 
coefficients; 𝑢𝑡  are heteroscedastic unobservable shocks with variance covariance matix Ω𝑡 
defined by  
𝐴𝑡Ω𝑡𝐴𝑡
′ = ∑𝑡∑𝑡,
′        (2) 
where 𝐴𝑡  is the lower triangular matrix,  
𝐴𝑡 = [
1 0 … … 0
𝑎10 1 ⋱ ⋱ ⋮
⋮ ⋱ ⋱ ⋱ 0
𝑎𝑛1,𝑡 … … 𝑎𝑛𝑛−1,𝑡 1
] 
and ∑𝑡 is the diagonal matrix 
∑𝑡 =
[
 
 
 
𝜎1,𝑡 0 … … 0
0 𝜎2,𝑡 ⋱ ⋱ ⋮
⋮ ⋱ ⋱ ⋱ 0
0 … … 0 𝜎𝑛,𝑡]
 
 
 
Thus, it follows that 
  ktktttt ByBCy ,1,1 .......... 𝐴𝑡
−1∑𝑡𝜀𝑡 (3) 
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𝑉(𝜀𝑡) = 𝐼𝑛
Stacking in a vector 𝐵𝑡 all the right hand side coefficients in equation-3 could be rephrased 
as: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑋𝑡
′𝐵𝑡 + 𝐴𝑡
−1∑𝑡𝜀𝑡 ,  (4) 
𝑋𝑡
′ = 𝐼𝑛⨂[1, 𝑦𝑡−1
′ , … , 𝑦𝑡−𝑘
′ ]
where the symbol ⨂ represents the Kronecker product. The decomposition of variance-
covariance matrix as presented in equation-4 is appropriate particularly when one is focused 
on efficiently estimating covariance matrices (see Smith and Kohn 2002, Primiceri 2005). A 
fairly similar decomposition was carried out by Cogley (2003) and Cogley and Sargent 
(2003) employing a Time-Varying VAR models, however, with a time-invariant 𝐴𝑡 matrix. 
As we have discussed that earlier, it is vital that to allow the matrix 𝐴𝑡 to be time-variant for 
the true spirit of a TV-SVAR framework. Keeping the 𝐴𝑡 constant would imply that an 
innovation to the 𝑖 − 𝑡ℎ variable has a time-invariant effect on the 𝑗 − 𝑡ℎ variable which is 
definitely inappropriate if we are aiming to model the time-variation in a simultaneous 
equation model, particularly, where simultaneous interactions among variables are 
fundamental as in this study
11
.
At this juncture, if we let the 𝑎𝑡 be the vector of non-zero and non-one elements of the matrix 
𝐴𝑡 and 𝜎𝑡 be the vector of the diagonal element s of the matrix ∑𝑡. The dynamics of our 
model’s time-varying parameter can be specified in the following fashion:  
𝐵𝑡 = 𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝑡, (5) 
𝑎𝑡 = 𝑎𝑡−1 + 𝜁𝑡, (6) 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜎𝑡 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜎𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝑡, (7) 
11
 The modelling strategy entails modelling the coefficient process in (4) and one to one mapping from equation 
1 to 4 provides justification to this approach. 
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where the components of the vector 𝐵𝑡 are modeled as the free elements of the matrix 𝐴𝑡
12  as
well as random walk. Although the random walk process might be considered undesirable 
here due to the general perception that that it hits any upper or lower bound with the 
probability 1. However, as long as (5 – 7) are placed for a finite period of time this set of 
assumption would be fairly innocuous. Nevertheless, the assumption of random walk comes 
with the benefit of reduced number of parameters as well as provides focus on permanent 
shifts (Primiceri, 2005). With the following assumptions on the variance covariance matrix, 
all the innovations in the model are assumed to be jointly normally distributed:  
𝑉 = 𝑉𝑎𝑟 =  ([
𝜀𝑡
𝑣𝑡
𝜁𝑡
𝜂𝑡
])  = [
𝐼𝑛 0 0 0
0 𝑄 0 0
0 0 𝑆 0
0 0 0 𝑊
] (8) 
where 𝐼𝑛 is a n n-dimensional identity matrix, 𝑄, 𝑆 and 𝑊 are positive definite matrices
13
.
The coefficients of the simultaneous associations among variables of interest are supposed to 
evolve independently in each equation, despite that this is not the fundamental assumption, 
yet it is beneficial due to the increases the efficiency of the estimation algorithm and it 
simplifies the inference.  
3.3 Bayesian Estimation 
The Bayesian approach is chosen for estimation and evaluation of posterior distribution of the 
parameters of interest, in specific to the subject case these are 𝐵𝑇 𝐴𝑇 Σ𝑇 and the
hyperparameters of the variance covariance matix 𝑉. The Bayesian approach is appropriate, 
particularly in scenario like this where the distinction between parameters and shocks is less 
clear while we are dealing with unobservable components
14
. The Gibbs Sampling is
12
Supposedly, the standard deviations 𝜎𝑡  are to evolve as geometric random walks and classed as stochastic
volatility, it can be considered as an alternative approach to the ARCH with the crucial difference that the 
variances generated are unobservable component. On this aspect Shepherd (1996) provided a good overview 
and comparative analysis of stochastic volatility models with ARCH. 
13
 Note: There isn’t any restrictions imposed on the structure of V which is essential as all the zero blocks could 
be substituted by non-zero blocks, it will require only minor alteration to the estimation procedure. Furthermore, 
there are two important reasons for which we choose V as the one specified in the equation (8). Firstly, we have 
high number of parameters of the model; hence, adding all the off diagonal elements of V would require the 
specification of a sensible prior, able to prevent cases of ill-determined parameters. Secondly, catering for a 
completely generic correlation structure among different sources of uncertainty would preclude any structural 
interpretation of the innovations.   
14
 Furthermore, Bayesian approached is preferred over the Classical estimation approach to estimate subject 
class models because a) if the variance of the time varying coefficients is small, the classical maximum 
likelihood estimator of this variance has a point mass at zero, related to the commonly called pile-up problem  b) 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
16 
employed for the posterior numerical evaluation of the parameters of interest which is a 
particular variant of the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) approach that consists of 
drawing from lower dimensional conditional posteriors as opposed to the high dimensional 
joint posterior of the whole parameter set. The MCMC is a smoothing method and therefore 
leads to obtain smoothed estimates i.e. parameter estimates of the parameters based on the 
entire set of data available to us. In specific to this study where we are analysing the 
implications of oil prices shocks for the true evolutions of internal and external balances, the 
smoothed estimates seems to be more efficient (See Primiceri, 2005)
15
. The filtered estimates
as one might have suggested would have not been appropriate in our analysis due transient 
variation they exhibit even when employing a time invariant framework (Sims, 2001).  
3.4 Prior Selection 
The selection of prior distributions is based on their appropriateness and applicability. To 
start with, the assumption that the hyperparameters are independent of each other and the 
initial states of the coefficients, for the covariances, for the log volatilities is legitimately 
initiative. The priors for the hyperparameters, 𝑄, 𝑊 and the blocks of S, are assumed to be 
distributed as independent inverse-Wishart. Whereas, the priors for the initial states of the 
time varying coefficients, simultaneous relations and log standard errors 𝑝(𝐵0), 𝑝(𝑎0), and 
𝑝(𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜎0), are assumed to be normally distributed. These assumptions together with (5), (6) 
and (7) imply normal priors on the entire sequences of the B’s, α’s and log σ’s (conditional 
on Q, W and S). The use of normal priors is fairly standard and also not being conjugate they 
have advantage in terms of tractability (See, Smith and Kohn 2002, Sims and Zha 1998, and 
Primiceri, 2005).  As mentioned earlier, the MCMC algorithm is used to generate a sample 
from the joint posterior of 𝐵𝑇 𝐴𝑇 Σ𝑇 and 𝑉. The Gibbs sampling is used in order to exploit
the blocking structure of the unknowns and it is performed in four steps, i) drawing in turn 
time varying coefficients 𝐵𝑇, ii) simultaneous relations 𝐴𝑇, iii) volatilities Σ𝑇 and iv)
Secondly, classical maximum likelihood is related to the high dimensionality and nonlinearity of the problem 
which is a problem as such a complicated model often has a likelihood with multiple peaks, some of which not 
much of interest or in the region of the parameter space which is not plausible. Furthermore, in case these peaks 
are very narrow, the likelihood may reach particularly high values, not at all representative of the model’s fit on 
a wider and more interesting parameter region. Interestingly, in Bayesian framework, the use of uninformative 
priors on reasonable regions of the parameter space is effective in ruling out such misbehaviours C) the 
practicality of approach, writing up of the likelihood of the model is possible (at least in principle) yet, it is very 
difficult to maximize it over a very high dimensional space.  Whereas, Bayesian approach very efficiently deals 
with the high dimension of the parameter space and the nonlinearities in the model, splitting the original 
estimation problem into smaller and simpler ones. Concomitantly, Bayesian seems the appropriate approach to 
consider.  
15
 The Strategy of considering the whole sample and then discrete break has an innovative aspect and will give 
us further insight into the under analysis relationship in two different ways. 
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hyperparameters 𝑉, conditional on the underlying observed data and the rest of the 
parameters
16
. The empirical framework layout above is applied on the dataset of BRICS
economies.  
3.5 Dataset 
The dataset includes the series on macroeconomic variables which are inflation and economic 
growth to present internal balance and balance of trade to present the external balance 
respectively.  The data on oil prices are also included. The overall period of analysis is from 
1987QII – 2017QII, however, depending on the availability of data, the period of analysis in 
each BRICS member country varied. We have quarterly observations on Brazil (1997QI- 
2016QIV), Russia (1997QI- 2017QII), India (1997QI – 2016QI), China (1998QI – 2017QII) 
and South Africa (1987QII–2016QIV). The choice of the period was contingent on the 
availability of data. In terms of proxies, for economic growth, we used the quarterly data on 
real GDP growth rate year on year percentage change. To proxy inflation, we used the 
monthly data on consumer price index, year on year percentage change, monthly observations 
were converted into quarterly by averaging. The trade balance as a percentage of GDP was 
used as a proxy for balance of trade in all the countries except Russia. Due to the non-
availability of this series, we used the percentage change in trade balance for Russia instead 
of trade balance as a percentage of GDP. 
4. Analysis and Findings
To gain some insight into the statistical properties of the employed dataset, we conducted a 
couple of tests prior to application of TV-SVAR framework. It entailed a unit root test using 
ADF approach test with structural breaks and lag selection tests. One may argue that 
Bayesian approach is not dependent on the requirement of stationarity as seminal work by 
Sims (1989) and Fanchon and Wendel (1992) suggested that no assumption of stationarity is 
required to be imposed under the Bayesian framework. However, doing so gave us some 
insight into the statistical properties of data and the presence of high nonlinearities. It 
suggested two as the optimal numbers of lags
17
 
18
. Thereafter we proceed with TV-SVAR
application. In terms of ordering of the variables oil prices shocks are ordered last due to the 
16
 For details on identification and structural interpretation, please see Primiceri (2005).   
17
 To determine an appropriate lag length, we performed a lag length section test using alternative information 
criteria (Akaike Information Criterion, Schwarz Information Criterion, Hannan-Quinn Information Criterion). 
Most of the lag selection criteria unanimously suggested two as optimal numbers of lags which are then 
incorporated into the analysis. 
18
 The results are not presented here to conserve the space, but are available on request. 
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exogenous nature of oil price shocks in our model. Moreover, the identification assumption 
also employs that oil prices shocks affect with lags. The simultaneous interaction between 
GDP, inflation, trade balance and oil prices shocks is arbitrarily modelled in a lower 
triangular form with GDP first. It is not an identification condition but for the sake of 
normalisation, although the arbitrary normalisation may have the potential to make 
difference, however, in this setting the ordering of GDP block did not affect the results. We 
choose 10000 iterations of Gibbs Sampling with a burn rate of 20% i.e. (2000 iterations). The 
36 observations (9 years) period was chosen for the training sample. We chose the last 3 
quarters of the data set available for each country to draw the impulses
19
. Starting from the
“B” of BRICS, the results are in Figure-3: 
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Figure-2: Impulse Response of Brazilian GDP, Inflation & Trade Balance to Oil Shocks 
The impulse responses of the Brazilian GDP showed a short-term positive response to 
positive oil price shocks, the effects persisted for 3 quarters of a year. Thereafter the response 
turned negative. The inflation also increased due to oil prices shocks and the effects of shocks 
19
 The impulses for the individual periods are not presented here to conserve the space, but are available on 
request. 
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persisted over 12 quarters. Implying only a short-term gain in terms of real GDP growth but 
long-term consequences in terms of high inflation. These findings are contrary to Sakashita 
and Yoshizaki (2016) and Cavalcanti and Jalles (2013) which could not find a clear and 
strong impact of oil shocks on inflation and GDP growth in Brazil. Perhaps, this is the 
novelty of our employed framework that we are incorporating the time-varying association 
among under analysis variables which gives us deeper insight. Hence, it is very intuitive that 
over time the importance of oil shocks has increased for Brazil. Interestingly, the balance of 
trade showed deterioration in response to positive oil prices shocks, which could be 
manifestly associated with the Dutch disease. Given that the Brazil is not the biggest exporter 
of oil and its economy is fairly diversified as compared to Russia, the results seemed to be 
very intuitive
20
. Next, we come the “R” of BRICS and the results are presented as follows:
 Russia 
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Figure-3: Impulse Response of Russian GDP, Inflation & Trade Balance to Oil Shocks 
The impulse response analysis of Russian GDP showed a positive impact of oil prices shocks 
on real GDP growth of the Russian economy which persisted for almost 6 quarters. This 
empirical evidence provides support to the assertions by Popova et al. (2017) which argued 
20
 At the same juncture they provide a rationale to dig further in this dimension for the various channels and 
industries through which this nexus may prevail, that would be beyond the scope of this treatise, however, for 
further lines of inquiries can be opened. 
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that the oil prices have strong effects on Russian GDP, although they did not provide any 
empirical support to their argument. Nonetheless, our findings are contrary to Idrisov et al. 
(2015) argument that the impact of oil prices shocks on Russian GDP has diminished, our 
findings suggest that it is not the case. Perhaps Idrisov et al. (2015) study was just theoretical 
analysis (DSGE simulations) without any empirical data whereas we employed the real-life 
data which suggests otherwise. Inflation, on the other hand, showed a negative response 
which also persisted for a prolonged period. The results were in line with the study by 
Sakashita and Yoshizaki (2016), though their results were not as highly significant as in the 
subject case, again it could be associated with the fact that their analysis did not account for 
any time variation which might have led to yielding insignificant result which are contrary to 
economic theory as well. Whereas our analysis clearly implies that oil prices shocks have a 
greater impact on Russia which is even more pronounced than effects on Brazil. In terms of 
inflation, the persistent negative impact is an interesting finding and could be associated with 
the strengthening of Russian currency with positive oil shocks as suggested by Dreger et al. 
(2016) which then might have led to the downward price pressure due to the pass-through 
channel. Hence, our findings give further insight and provide evidence of this disinflationary 
impact of oil price hikes for the Russian economy. On the external balance, the balance of 
trade showed a positive response to oil price shocks which persisted for almost 3 quarters of a 
year. These findings as compared to Brazil are interesting in a way that there is an obvious 
asymmetry in the response of Brazilian and Russian economies to oil prices shocks though 
both of them are oil exporters. It indicates a significant difference in the structure of these 
economies and role of oil. Next, we come to “I” of BRICS and the results are presented as 
follow: 
 India 
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Figure-4: Impulse Response of Indian GDP, Inflation & Trade Balance to Oil Shocks 
The impulse response analysis of the Indian real GDP growth showed a negative impact of 
oil prices shocks which persisted for a prolonged period of time i.e. over 12 quarters. 
Similarly, inflation also showed a surge which persisted for an equivalent period to real GDP. 
It evidently implied that oil prices shocks have in fact very severe negative impact on the 
Indian economy’s internal balance between inflation and GDP growth21. The results were
contrary to Varghese (2017, page 1) assertion on the impact of oil shocks on inflation that in 
India “price of petroleum products are insulated against international crude oil prices 
fluctuations by way of subsidies in order to curb inflation”22. Perhaps, we can prima facie
report a direct impact of an oil shock on inflation. Nonetheless, our findings are in line with 
the studies by Sakashita and Yoshizaki (2016) and Cunado et al. (2015), on the impact of oil 
shocks on inflation and GDP growth. Although, their results based on time-invariant SVAR 
were not very highly significant the impact of oil shocks was very mild. Nevertheless, the 
picture of external balance was also gloomy as oil shocks led to a sharp deterioration of the 
trade balance which persisted for 3 quarters of a year. The results on trade balance supported 
the argument put forward by Tiwari et al. (2014). Overall, the results implied that the Indian 
economy is in fact very vulnerable to oil prices shocks. Next, we come to the “C” and the 
largest economy of the BRICS, the results are presented as follow: 
21
 Perhaps, in terms of policy formulation and response, it implies a difficult trade-off monetary authority 
(Reserve Bank of India) may face. 
22
 Though Varghese (2017) also argued that in the long run, inflation manifest itself in the form of worsening 
fiscal deficit and undermine the sustainability of public debt. 
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Figure-5: Impulse Response of Chinese GDP, Inflation & Trade Balance to Oil Shocks 
The impulse response of the Chinese real GDP showed a negative impact of oil prices shocks 
which started to materialise gradually and persisted for a prolonged period of time i.e. 12 
quarters. The materialisation of the impact of oil price shocks with lags is intuitive as the hike 
in oil prices may take some time to feed through and appear in succeeding period’s data on 
real GDP growth. Similarly, inflation also showed a hike in response to oil prices shock, 
notably, although on GDP the impact was similar to India, however on inflation, there was 
some dissimilarity as the effects on inflation started to fade after 7 quarters. Compared to the 
existing evidence, results were in line with Du et al. (2010) analysis on the impact of an oil 
shock on GDP, although in our case the results were more pronounced which indicates the 
increased importance of oil shocks for China
23
. Nonetheless, contrary to findings by Du et al.
(2010) our results suggested an increase in inflation in response to oil shocks which is more 
intuitive and akin to the response of high energy consumption economy.  
23
 Du et al (2008) employed a time invariant VAR model on data from 1995-2008.Since then the Chinese 
economy has seen a decade a development and growth. 
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The response of inflation was even greater than reported by and Ou et al. (2012) which 
implied increase importance of oil shocks for inflation and concomitantly implications for the 
monetary policy.  The balance of trade also showed an initial negative response to oil price 
shocks which however recovered after 3 quarters. The severity of impact for the Chinese 
economy’s external position compared with the Indian economy was, however, a lot milder, 
which is obviously a very intuitive finding if we consider the fact that China has a very strong 
trade position. Our findings on China have interesting implications if we compare them with 
the earlier cited argument by Lai (2004), Thai-Ha (2010) and Wu et al. (2012) which argued 
that oil prices shocks are not of much concern for China as it has amassed huge surpluses, 
maintained a stable currency and growth. Our analysis suggests that even if China has 
maintained the high trade surpluses due to the strength of the exporting sector, the importance 
of oil prices shocks on its domestic economy and in particularly GDP growth and inflation 
are non-trivial. Perhaps, it poses challenges to the monetary authority and its efforts towards 
price stability. Particularly, if we consider that time-varying and an increasing appetite for oil 
and energy in the fast developing Chinese economy, it is clearly evident that the importance 
of oil prices shocks have been increased. Lastly, we come to “S” of the BRICS and results are 
as follow: 
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Figure-6: Impulse Response of South African GDP, Inflation & Trade Balance to Oil 
Shocks 
The impulse response of South Africa’s real GDP growth showed an overall negative impact 
of oil price shocks after an initial minor surge in GDP. The findings add to the study 
Chisadza et al. (2016) which showed that output is positively affected by oil demand and oil-
specific demand shocks, while an oil supply shock has no significant effect
24
. In this regard,
our results suggest that despite initial increases, there are long-term negative consequences of 
oil shocks for GDP. This finding implies that the argument that oil prices increases do not 
have negative effects on the South African economy needs to be taken with a pinch of salt. 
Adding further to Chisadza et al. (2016) results, inflation also showed a positive response 
which faded after a few quarters. The persistence for the few quarters still implies that oil 
shocks can have implications for price stability, at least in the short to medium term. The 
impact on trade balance was negative which persisted for several periods (quarters). Without 
downplaying the importance for the domestic economy, one inference we can draw here is 
that the external balance of the South African economy is comparatively more vulnerable to 
oil prices shocks. Interestingly, dissimilar to all the other countries of BRICS the responses in 
South African inflation showed some dissimilarity in the impact in a different period. It 
indicated stronger time variation in the response of the South African economy to oil prices 
shocks. On the external balance, oil prices shocks led to the persistent deterioration of trade 
balance, which indicates the manifested significance of oil prices shocks for the South 
African economy’s external position. 
5. Conclusion and Policy Implications
The BRICS have turned out to be a globally significant and influential, economic and 
political block with its five members constituting almost half of the world’s total population 
(46% to be precise). Interestingly, along with the socio-cultural, intuitional and political 
heterogeneities, the BRICS also consists of countries which includes oil importers as well as 
oil exporters, this heterogeneity is manifested in the varying degree of reliance and 
dependence on oil and dynamics of its prices. Keeping that in context, in this study we 
analysed and compared the implications of oil prices shocks for the BRICS economies. For 
24
 Chisadza et al (2016) used a time invariant SVAR with the sign restriction there are certain limitations of this 
approach In particular, not allowing for the time variation and imposing sign restrictions limits the view whereas 
in the subject case we let the data speaks for itself (see Kilian and Lütkepohl, 2017 for detailed insight).  
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this purpose, a time-varying structural vector autoregressive (TV-SVA) framework was 
employed in which the sources of time variation were both the coefficients and variance-
covariance matrix of the innovations. We contextualise the subject treatise and analysis of 
association among the variables of interest in the light of net oil trade position of the BRICS 
members.  
The empirical findings lead us to conclude that there are substantial differences and 
heterogeneities in the responses of the BRICS economies to oil prices shocks in terms of 
internal and external balances of these economies. In the major oil exporters of the BRICS 
members i.e. Brazil and Russia, the effects on economic growth were more pronounced in the 
latter. Similarly, there was asymmetry in the response of inflation and balance of trade, 
particularly the negative response of Brazilian balance of trade suggests Dutch disease and 
overall negative impact of oil prices on the balance of trade. It implies the substantial 
differences in the structure of two economies as well as the greater reliance of the Russian 
economy on oil than Brazil. In terms of policy setting these findings have profound 
implications, it is prima facie that the Russian economy reliance on oil is still paramount. The 
claims of a decrease in such an importance as some studies suggested, do not hold their 
grounds in the face of empirical evidence. Concomitantly, Russia needs to do more to 
restructure its economy. In case of major importers i.e. India and China, the results intuitively 
showed a negative impact on inflation and GDP as well as on the balance of trade, however, 
there were substantial differences in the intensity of impact and it leads us to conclude that 
the Indian economy seemed to be rather more vulnerable to oil prices shocks than the 
Chinese economy. These vulnerabilities were explicitly in the internal and external 
imbalances of the Indian economy due to oil prices shocks. Nonetheless, compared to the 
Indian, the Chinese economy and particularly its balance of trade might be able to neutralise 
the intensity of oil prices shocks due to its strong external position, however, there are still 
profound implications of oil prices shocks for the domestic Chinese economy in terms of 
GDP growth and inflation. Nonetheless, the increasing demand and consumption of oil in 
economies will continue to pose ecological challenges. In terms of monetary policy 
implication, it also implies that for China and India oil shocks are very important in terms of 
policy settings. However, given that contrary to China, the monetary authority in India 
(Reserve Bank of India) has an explicit inflation targeting regime, concomitantly, oil shocks 
are even more important for its ability to achieve the target. Nonetheless, it also implies that 
despite the fiscal measures (subsidies and price control) in India to counter oil prices shocks 
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on inflation, the results suggest that they are still inflationary. Nonetheless, oil shocks 
worsened the external position of Indian economy. Hence, India needs to revisit its policy 
towards the oil market. Besides the absence of inflation targeting regime in China, it does not 
imply that the importance of oil shocks is negligible, perhaps, instead of inflation, China has 
an explicit annual output growth rate target which then implies that oil shocks can have 
profound implications for the policy setting to achieve this target.  
The analysis on South Africa also showed negative impacts of oil prices shocks on the 
economy. The interesting element was stronger time variation in the response of South 
African economy as compared to the other BRICS countries even in the successive quarters. 
In terms of policy setting, given that the South African Reserve Bank has adopted the 
inflation targeting, oil prices shocks and the findings in the subject study have important 
lessons to draw on. Overall, the BRICS showed asymmetries in the economies in response to 
oil prices shocks between and within oil exporters and importers, while these asymmetries 
indicate significant differences in the structure of these economies they also point towards 
venues of cooperation and stronger trading relationships to overcome the adverse shocks and 
mutual development. Perhaps, the trading arrangement which can hedge against the adverse 
shocks to oil importing and oil exporting economies of BRICS is an important oil implication 
as well a venue for further research in this area.  
References 
Amano, R. and Van Norden, S. (1998). Oil prices and the rise and fall of the US real 
exchange rate. Journal of International Money and Finance, 17, 299-316.  
Backus, D. K. and Crucini, M. J. (2000). Oil prices and the terms of trade. Journal of 
International Economics, 50, 185-213.  
Barsky, R. B. and Kilian, L. (2004). Oil and the Macroeconomy since the 1970s. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 18, 115-134. 
Benedictow, A., Fjaertoft, D. and Løfsnæs, O. (2013). Oil dependency of the Russian 
economy: An econometric analysis. Economic Modelling, 32, 400-428.  
Bodenstein, M., Erceg, C. J. and Guerrieri, L. (2011). Oil shocks and external adjustment. 
Journal of International Economics, 83, 168-184.   
Boivin, J. (2001). The Feds Conduct of Monetary Policy: Has It Changed and Does It 
Matter?, Columbia Business School, mimeo. 
Bollino, C. A. (2007). Oil prices and the U.S. trade deficit. Journal of Policy Modelling, 29, 
729-738.
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
27 
Brazilian Ministry of Finance (2014). Economic Data and Trade Statistics, Information on 
foreign trade, available at [http://brics.itamaraty.gov.br/about-brics/economic-data] accessed 
on 5
th
 June 2017.
Buetzer, S. and Habib, M. (2012). Global Exchange Rate Configurations: Do Oil Shocks 
Matter? European Central Bank Working Papers, 1442, 221-232. 
Canova, F. (1993). Modelling and Forecasting Exchange Rates with a Bayesian Time-
Varying Coefficient Model. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 17, 233-261. 
Cashin, P., Mohaddesb, K., Raissic, M. and Raissia, M. (2014). The differential effects of oil 
demand and supply shocks on the global economy, Energy Economics, 44, 113-134. 
Cavalcanti, T. and Jalles, J. T. (2013). Macroeconomic effects of oil price shocks in Brazil 
and in the United States. Applied Energy, 104, 475-486. 
Chib, S., Nardari, F. and Shephard, N.  (2002). Analysis of High Dimensional Multivariate 
Stochastic Volatility Models. Nuffield College, University of Oxford, mimeo.  
Chisadza, C., Dlamini, J., Gupta, R. and Modise, M. P. (2016). The impact of oil shocks on 
the South African economy. Energy Sources, Part B: Economics, Planning, and Policy, 11, 
739-745.
Ciccarelli, M. and Rebucci, A. (2003). Measuring Contagion with a Bayesian Time- Varying 
Coefficient Model, International Monetary Fund, mimeo. 
Cogley, T. and Sargent, T.J. (2001). Evolving Post-World War II U.S. Inflation Dynamics. 
NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 331-373. 
Cunado, J., Jo, S. and Gracia, F. P. D. (2015). Macroeconomic impacts of oil price shocks in 
Asian economies. Energy Policy, 86, 867-879.  
Del Negro, M. and Primiceri, G. (2015). Time Varying Structural Vector Autoregressions 
and Monetary Policy: A Corrigendum. The Review of Economic Studies, 82, 1342-1345. 
Dornbusch, R., Fischer, S. and Startz, R. (2001). Macroeconomics, 8th edition, McGraw-Hill. 
Dreger, C., Kholodilin, K. A., Ulbricht, D. and Fidrmuc, J. (2016). Between the hammer and 
the anvil: The impact of economic sanctions and oil prices on Russia’s ruble, Journal of 
Comparative Economics, 44, 295-308.  
Du, L., He, Y. and Wei, C. (2010). The relationship between oil shocks and china’s macro-
economy: an empirical analysis. Energy Policy, 38, 4142-4151. 
Dülger, F., Lopcu, K., Burgaç, A. and Balli, E. (2013). Is Russia suffering from Dutch 
Disease? Cointegration with Structural break. Resources Policy, 38 (4), 605-612.  
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
28 
Enerdata (2017). Crude oil balance of trade, Global Energy Statistical Yearbook 2016, 
available at [https://yearbook.enerdata.net/crude-oil-balance-trade.html] accessed on 5
th
 June
2017.  
Fanchon, P. and Wendel, J. (1992). Estimating VAR models under non-stationarity and 
cointegration: alternative approaches for forecasting cattle prices. Applied Economics, 24, 
207-217.
Ferderer, J. (1996). Oil price volatility and the Macroeconomy. Journal of Macroeconomics, 
18, 1-26. 
Fratzscher, M., Schneider, D. and Robays, I.V. (2014). Oil Prices, Exchange Rates and Asset 
Prices, Working Paper Series NO 1689 / July.  
FRED (2017), Crude Oil Prices: Brent – Europe, available at 
[https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DCOILBRENTEU] accessed on 5
th
 June 2017.
Gounder, R. and Bartleet M. (2007). Oil Price Shocks and Economic Growth: Evidence for 
New Zealand, 1989-2006. Paper Presented at New Zealand Association of Economist Annual 
Conference, Christchurch, 27th to 29th June. 
Halkos, G. E. and Tzeremes, N. G. (2011), Oil consumption and economic efficiency: A 
comparative analysis of advanced, developing and emerging economies. Ecological 
Economics, 70, 1354–1362.  
Hamilton, J. (1983). Oil and the Macroeconomy since World War II. The Journal of Political 
Economy, 91, 228-248.  
Hamilton, J. (1996). This is what happened to the Oil Price- Macroeconomy Relationship. 
The Journal of Monetary Economics, 38, 215-220.  
Hamilton, J. (2003). What is an Oil Shock? Journal of Econometric, 113, 363-396.  
Harvey, A.C. Ruiz, E. and Shephard, N. (1994). Multivariate Stochastic Variance Models. 
Review of Economic Studies, 61, 247-264. 
Hunt, B. L., Laxton, D. and Isard, P. (2001). The Macroeconomic Effects of Higher Oil 
Prices, Working Paper No 1/14.  
Idrisov, G., Kazakova, M. and Polbin, N.  (2015). A Theoretical interpretation of the oil 
prices impact on economic growth in contemporary Russia. Russian Journal of Economic, 1, 
257-272.
IMF (2015), World Economic Outlook, available at 
[http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/02/index.htm] accessed on < 22nd January 
2016>. 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
29 
Ito, K (2008). Oil prices and Macro-economy in Russia: The co-integrated VAR Model 
Approach. International Applied Economics and Management letters, 1, 37-40. 
Jimenez-Rodriguez, R. and Sanchez, M (2005). Oil shocks and real GDP growth: empirical 
evidence for some OECD countries. Applied Economics, 37, 201-228. 
Kallis, G. and Sager, J. (2017). Oil and the economy: A systematic review of the literature for 
ecological economists. Ecological Economics, 131, 561-571.   
Kilian, L. (2009). Not all oil price shocks are alike: Disentangling demand and supply shocks 
in the crude oil market. American Economic Review, 99, 1053-1069.  
Kilian, L., Rebucci, A. and Spatafora, N. (2009). Oil shocks and external balances, Journal of 
International Economics, 77, 181-194.  
Kilian, L. and Vigfusson, R. J. (2011). Are the responses of the U.S. economy asymmetric in 
energy price increases and decreases? Quantitative Economics, 2, 419-453. 
Kilian, L. and Vigfusson, R. J. (2011b). Nonlinearities in the Oil Price-Output Relationship. 
Macroeconomic Dynamics, 15, 337-363. 
Kilian, L., & Lütkepohl, H. (2017). Structural Vector Autoregressive Analysis (Themes in 
Modern Econometrics). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Kim, I-M. and Loungani, P.  (1992). The Role of Energy in Real Business Cycle Models. 
Journal of Monetary Economics, 29, 173-189. 
Kim, S., Shephard, N. and Chib, S.  (1998). Stochastic Volatility: Likelihood Inference and 
Comparison with ARCH Models. Review of Economic Studies, 65, 361-393.  
Kuboniwa, M. (2014). A comparative analysis of the impact of oil prices on oil-rich 
emerging economies in the Pacific Rim. Journal of Comparative Economics, 42, 328-339.  
Le, T. H. and Chang, Y. (2013). Oil price shocks and trade imbalances. Energy Economics, 
36, 78-96.   
Lizardo, R. A. and Mollick, A.V. (2010). Oil price fluctuations and US dollar exchange rates. 
Energy Economics Journal, 32, 399-408. 
Mironov, V. V. and Petronevich, A. V. (2015). Discovering the signs of Dutch disease in 
Russia. Resources Policy, 46, 97-112.  
Narayan, P. K. and Sharma, S. S. (2011). New evidence on oil price and firm returns. Journal 
of Banking and Finance, 35 (12), 3253-3262. 
Ou, B., Zhang, X. and Wang, S. (2012). How does China’s macro-economy response to the 
world crude oil price shock: A structural dynamic factor model approach. Computers & 
Industrial Engineering, 63, 634-640,  
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
30 
Ozlale, U. and Pekkurnaz, D. (2010). Oil prices and current account: A structural analysis for 
the Turkish economy. Energy Policy, 38, 4489-4496  
Primiceri, G. E. (2005). Time Varying Structural Vector Auto-regression and Monetary 
Policy. Review of Economic Studies, 72, Pages 8214 – 852.  
Qianqian, Z (2011). The Impact of International Oil price Fluctuation on China’s economy. 
Energy Procedia, 5, 136-1364. 
Popova, L., Jabalameli, F. and Rasoulinezhad, E. (2017). Oil Price Shocks and Russia’s 
Economic Growth: The Impacts and Policies for Overcoming Them. World Sociopolitical 
Studies, 1, 1-31.  
Raguindin, C. E. and Reyes, R. G.  (2005). The effects of Oil price shocks on the Philippine 
economy: A VAR Approach. Working paper, University of the Philippines School of 
Economics, 3, 117-123.  
Rautava, J. (2004). The role of oil prices and the real exchange rate in Russia's economy – a 
cointegration approach. Journal of Comparative Economics, 32, 315-327.  
Reynolds, D. B. (2014). World oil production trend: Comparing Hubbert multi-cycle curves. 
Ecological Economics, 98, 62-71.   
Rotemberg, J. J. and Woodford, M. (1996). Imperfect competition and the effects of energy 
price increases on economic activity. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 28, 550-577.  
Rafiq, S., Sgro, P.  and Apergis, A.  (2016). Asymmetric Oil shocks and external balances of 
major oil exporting and importing countries. Energy Economics, 42-50. 
Sakashita, Y. and Yoshizaki, Y. (2016). The Effects of Oil Price Shocks on IIP and CPI in 
Emerging Countries. Economies, 4, 2-9.  
Shephard, N. (1996). Statistical aspects of ARCH and stochastic volatility. Time Series 
Models in Econometrics, Finance and Other Fields, (edited by D.R. Cox, David V. Hinkley 
and Ole E. Barndorff-Neilsen), 1-67. London: Chapman & Hall. 
Sims, C. A. (1988). Bayesian skepticism on unit root econometrics. Journal of Economic 
Dynamics and Control, 12, 463-474.  
Sims, C. A. (1993). A 9 Variable Probabilistic Macroeconomic Forecasting Model”, in J. H. 
Stock and M. W. Watson (Eds.), Business Cycles, Indicators and Forecasting, NBER Studies 
in business cycles volume 28, 179-214. 
Sims, C. A. (1999). Drift and Breaks in Monetary Policy, Princeton University, mimeo. 
Sims C. A.  ZHA, T. (2006). Were There Regime Switches in US Monetary Policy? 
American Economic Review, 96, 54-81.  
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
31 
Smith, M. and Kohn, R.  (2002). Parsimonious Covariance Matrix Estimation for 
Longitudinal Data. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 97, 1141-1153. 
Statista (2017), Global oil industry and market, Global Oil Industry and Market - Statistics & 
Facts, available at [https://www.statista.com/topics/1783/global-oil-industry-and-market/] 
accessed on 19
th
 May 2017.
Stock J. H. and Watson, M.W.  (1996). Evidence on Structural Instability in Macroeconomic 
Time Series Relations. Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 14, 11-30. 
Tang, W., Wu, L. and Zhang, Z. (2010). Oil price shocks and their short- and long-term 
effects on the Chinese economy. Energy Economics, 32, S3-S14. 
Tiwari, A. K., Arouri, M. and Teulon, F. (2014). Oil prices and trade balance: a frequency 
domain analysis for India. Economics Bulletin, 34, 663-680.  
Uhlig, H. (1997). Bayesian Vector Auto-regressions with Stochastic Volatility. 
Econometrica, 65, 59-73.  
Verleger, P. K. (1994). Adjusting to Volatile Energy Prices, Peterson Institute.  
Varghese, G. (2017). Inflationary effects of oil price shocks in Indian economy. Journal of 
Public Affairs, 17, 1-9.  
Wang, Y., Wu, C. and Yang, L. (2013). Oil price shocks and stock market activities: 
Evidence from oil-importing and oil-exporting countries. Journal of Comparative Economics, 
41, 1220-1239.  
Wakeford, J. (2006). The impact of oil price Shocks on the South African Macro economy: 
History and Prospects, in Accelerated and Shared Growth in South Africa: Determinants, 
constraints and opportunities.  Journal of Economics, 1, 18-20.  
Wei, Y. and Guo, X. (2016). An empirical analysis of the relationship between oil prices and 
the Chinese macro-economy. Energy Economics, 56, 88-100. 
World Bank (2016). Russian Economic Report. World Bank in Russia, No 16. 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
32 
Appendix
BRICS 10 main product groups exported in 2012, Source; Brazil Ministry of Finance (2014) 
 BRICS 10 main product groups Imported in 2012 Source; Brazil Ministry of Finance (2014) 
Electrical machines 
16.0% 
Fuels 
15.5% 
Mechanical machines 
13.0% 
Gold and precious 
stones 
3.9% Textile clothing 
2.9% 
Automobiles 
2.9% 
Iron and steel 
2.7% 
Furniture 
2.5% 
Precision instruments 
2.4% 
Iron/steel products 
2.2% 
Other 
36.1% 
Fuels 
19.2% 
Electrical machines 
16.3% 
Mechanical machines 
11.1% 
Automibiles 
5.1%Mineral ores 
4.9% 
Precision instruments 
4.5% 
Plastics 
3.4% 
Gold and precious 
stones 
3.3% 
Organic chemicals 
3.1% 
Copper 
2.1% 
Other 
27.1% 
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Oil Shocks & Implications for the Major Emerging Economies: A Comparative Analysis of 
BRICS. 
A Time Varying Framework to capture the Time Varying dependency of BRICS on Oil and 
its consumption.  
Substantial differences and asymmetries in the response of BRICS economies to the oil 
shocks. 
Profound between and even within the oil exporters and importers. 
Russian economy more intensively influenced by the oil shocks than Brazilian. 
Indian economy more vulnerable to oil shocks than Chinese. 
South African economy showing high Time Variant impact of oil shocks. 
Increasing importance and consumption of oil in BRICS continue to pose new set of 
challenges.  
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